Description
Confidential Computing microconferences in the past years brought together developers working secure execution features in hypervisors, firmware, Linux Kernel, over low-level user space up to container runtimes. A broad range of topics were discussed ranging from entablement for hardware features up to generic attestation workflows.
In the past year - guest memfd has been merged, TDX and SNP host support is getting closer to being merged. Next to go in will be support for ARM CCA and RISC V CoVE. In the meantime, there is progress being made on the Trusted I/O front.
But there is still some way to go and problems to be solved before a secure Confidential Computing stack with open source software and Linux as the hypervisor becomes a reality. The most pressing problems right now are:
- Support TEE privilege separation extensions (TDX partitioning and AMD SEV-SNP VM Privilege Levels) both on the guest and host side
- Secure IRQ delivery
- Secure VM Service Module (SVSM) support for multiple TEE architectures
- Trusted I/O software architecture
- Live migration of confidential virtual machines
Other potential problems to discuss are:
- Remote attestation architectures
- Deployment of Confidential VMs
- Linux as a CVM operating system across hypervisors
- Unification of various confidential computing API
The Confidential Computing Microconference wants to bring developers working on confidential computing together again to discuss these and other open problems.
Key attendees:
- Ashish Kalra ashish.kalra@amd.com
- Atish Patra atishp04@gmail.com
- Borislav Petkov bp@alien8.de
- Carlos Bilbao carlos.bilbao@amd.com
- Chao Peng chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
- Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
- Daniel P. Berrangé berrange@redhat.com
- Dr. David Alan Gilbert dgilbert@redhat.com
- David Hansen dhansen@linux.intel.com
- David Kaplan David.Kaplan@amd.com
- David Rientjes rientjes@google.com
- Dhaval Giani dhaval.giani@amd.com
- Dionna Amalie Glaze dionnaglaze@google.com
- Elena Reshetova elena.reshetova@intel.com
- James Bottomley jejb@linux.ibm.com
- Jeremy Powell jeremy.powell@amd.com
- Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de
- Kirill A. Shutemov kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
- Michael Roth michael.roth@amd.com
- Mike Rapoport rppt@kernel.org
- Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com
- Peter Gonda pgonda@google.com
- Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com
- Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Claudio Carvalho, Stefano Garzarella (Red Hat), Tyler Fanelli (Red Hat)20/09/2024, 10:00
The integration of Secure Virtual Machine Service Module (SVSM) with virtual Trusted Platform Modules (vTPMs) is a critical component in establishing trust and security for confidential virtual machines (CVMs). This session delves into the latest advancements in SVSM vTPM technology, covering a wide range of topics from boot attestation to persistent storage and future development...
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Chuanxiao Dong, Jason Chen, Mr Jiewen Yao (Intel Corporation), Peter Fang, Vijay Dhanraj20/09/2024, 10:20
Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) coupled with Coconut-SVSM is emerging as a powerful combination for secure and efficient virtualization. This talk delves into the intricacies of Intel TD Partitioning, its role in running an SVSM, and its integration with a virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM).
We will provide a comprehensive overview of TD Partitioning, explaining its architecture,...
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Derek Miller (Arm Ltd)20/09/2024, 10:40
A discussion of the requirements and trade-offs that led to the planes feature of the Arm Confidential Compute Architecture, as well as a description of the system as specified. This discussion will lead to the requirements for and a description of our proposed specification for inter-plane communication on Arm platforms.
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Chris Oo (Microsoft)20/09/2024, 11:00
Guest operating systems generally require modifications, referred to as enlightenments, to run under different Confidential computing architectures such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX. To support unenlightened guests, a software component called a paravisor is required. The paravisor runs at a higher privilege level within the guest to provide the appropriate abstractions and security guarantees...
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Muhammad Usama Sardar (TU Dresden)20/09/2024, 11:15
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a widely used protocol for secure channel establishment. However, it lacks an inherent mechanism for validating the security state of the workload and its platform. To address this, remote attestation can be integrated in TLS, which is named attested TLS. In this talk, we present a survey of the three approaches for this integration, namely pre-handshake...
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Jinank Jain (Microsoft), Mr Muminul Islam (Microsoft)20/09/2024, 12:00
As cloud technologies continue to advance at a rapid pace, there arises a critical need to assess the performance disparities among various virtualization stacks. This presentation aims to shed light on the comparative performance, scalability, and efficiency of two prominent hypervisor technologies—KVM/QEMU and Linux as Root Partition for Microsoft Hyper-V with Cloud-Hypervisor as VMM —within...
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Alexey Kardashevskiy (AMD), Dan Williams (Intel Open Source Technology Center), Mr Jiewen Yao (Intel Corporation), Samuel Ortiz, Suzuki Kuruppassery Poulose (Arm Holdings Ltd)20/09/2024, 12:20
The secure and efficient transfer of data between confidential computing environments and the outside world is a critical challenge. This session brings together experts from different architectures to discuss the latest advancements in trusted I/O. We will explore the design principles, implementation details, and interoperability aspects of emerging standards such as RISC-V CoVE-IO, Arm CCA,...
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David Hartley (Qualcomm Germany GmbH)20/09/2024, 12:50
The PCIe TEE Device Interface Security Protocol (TDISP, aka TEE-I/O) specifies requirements for a TEE Security Manager (TSM) on the host and a Device Security Manager (DSM) on a PCIe device, including an on-chip Root Complex-integrated Endpoint (RCiEP). TDISP also specifies protocols between TSM and DSM to establish trust between a confidential VM and a PCIe device or function, secure the...
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RAVI SAHITA (Rivos)20/09/2024, 13:00
This session will discuss the ongoing development of the RISC-V architecture for Confidential VM Extension (CoVE) and related CoVE-IO (for TEE-IO). The discussion will cover both the WIP ISA (CPU) and non-ISA (ABI, IOMMU and other platform aspects) extensions. The WIP ISA extensions will cover the proposed Smmtt (memory isolation) and related extensions for interrupts isolation, IO-MTT and...
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Chris Porter (IBM Research), Claudio Carvalho, Daniele Buono (IBM), Niteesh Dubey (IBM), Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (IBM)20/09/2024, 13:10
Trustee, formerly referred to as KBS, is a set of attestation and key management services for confidential workloads. In the past year the project has grown considerably, now supporting attestation of 8 different confidential platforms. This talk will briefly introduce the project and these updates but the main focus is ongoing work.
The talk will touch on the community's plan to support...
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