Conveners
System Boot and Security MC
- Piotr Krรณl (3mdeb)
- Daniel Kiper
Description
The System Boot and Security Microconference has been a critical platform for
enthusiasts and professionals working on firmware, bootloaders, system boot,
and security. This year, once again, we want to focus on the challenges that
arise when upstreaming boot process improvements to the Linux kernel and
bootloaders. Our experience shows that the introduction of new and/or not well-known
technologies into the kernel are especially difficult. The TrenchBoot project
is a very good example here, but we think others are also impacted. So, it would
be good to take all project stakeholders in one room and think what does not
work, what can be improved, etc. Though we are also happy to hear and discuss
what is currently happening in other areas related to platform initialization
and OS boot. Especially discussion about obstacles, not only technical ones,
during upstreaming and finding solutions during the MC can be very valuable for
various projects and the audience.
We welcome talks on the following things that can help achieve the goals mentioned above:
- TrenchBoot, tboot,
- TPMs, HSMs, secure elements,
- Roots of Trust: SRTM and DRTM,
- Intel TXT, SGX, TDX,
- AMD SKINIT, SEV,
- ARM DRTM,
- Growing Attestation ecosystem,
- IMA,
- TianoCore EDK II (UEFI), SeaBIOS, coreboot, U-Boot, LinuxBoot, hostboot,
- Measured Boot, Verified Boot, UEFI Secure Boot, UEFI Secure Boot Advanced Targeting (SBAT),
- shim,
- boot loaders: GRUB, systemd-boot/sd-boot, network boot, PXE, iPXE,
- UKI,
- u-root,
- OpenBMC, u-bmc,
- legal, organizational, and other similar issues relevant to people interested
in the system boot and security.
The LVFS Host Security ID (HSI) has become the de facto standard for measuring
platform security in Linux, with major distributions adopting it to present
security posture to end users. Designed primarily around proprietary UEFI
implementations, HSI may present edge cases for open-source firmware vendors
working with diverse firmware stacks like coreboot and edk2.
This session examines...
As Secure Launch approaches its integration into the kernel, this presentation will revisit the Secure ReLaunch capability. We will conduct a thorough review of D-RTM โlate launchโ and discuss the various use cases it addresses. Additionally, a brief exploration of the TrenchBoot projectโs approach to โlate launchโ through Secure ReLaunch will be included. The session will conclude with a...
Abstract
We have defended our position (cf. [expat BoF][1]) to standardize the attested TLS protocol in the [IETF][2], and a new Working Group named [Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport (SEAT)][3] has been formed to exclusively tackle this specific problem. We would like to present the work (candidate [draft][4] for standardization) and gather feedback from the security community on...
Oak stage0 is a VM firmware, mainly targeting QEMU microvm and Q35 machines (and compatible VMMs) that is simpler (and less featureful) than the traditional choices of EDK2/OVMF and SeaBIOS. The main purpose of stage0 is to provide a smaller and simpler method of booting confidential virtual machines to reduce the TCB. To that end, stage0 supports AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX; stage0 is the first...
Android boot flow quick recap
- Current problems
- Fastboot
GBL proposal
- Android meets UEFI
- Existing protocols adoption
- GBL custom protocol for Android Boot
Android UEFI Upstreaming
- EFI implementation for LittleKernel
- GBL protocols (EDK2, LittleKernel, Uboot)
Android Adoption of DRTM - How could the ARM DRTM spec be updated to account for Android boot'isms in a HLOS...