Speaker
Description
Abstract:
This talk is a follow-up of LPC'25, where we introduced the security problem to the community for a suitable approach of attested TLS protocols. We would like to present updates to the work since LPC'25 and discuss open problems with the community so that the feedback can be accommodated in the standardization in the IETF. In particular, we share the discovered CVE (CVE-2026-33697) and other critical-severity security concerns and discuss our proposals.
Background:
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a widely used protocol for secure channel establishment. However, it lacks an inherent mechanism for validating the security state of the workload and its platform. To address this, remote attestation can be integrated into TLS, which is named attested TLS protocol.
In this talk, we present an overview of the two key approaches for this integration, namely early and standard attestation. We also present insights from the formal verification using the state-of-the-art symbolic security analysis tool ProVerif to provide high confidence for use in security-critical applications.
Current project partners include Arm, Linaro, Siemens, Huawei, Intuit, Axis, Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences, and Barkhausen Institut. By this talk, we hope to inspire more open-source contributors to this project.
The attendees will gain technical insights into the latest developments of standardization of attested TLS protocols in the IETF, and will be able to provide feedback on the requirements for their use cases of attested TLS.
Benefits to the ecosystem
Our thorough analysis shows that early attestation is potentially vulnerable to replay, relay, and diversion attacks. Our analysis shows that standard attestation offers better security properties than early attestation, forming a valuable contribution to the TEE attestation ecosystem.