

# A Ridiculously Short Intro into Device Attestation

*Thursday 27 August 2020 09:35 (20 minutes)*

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Very practical look at how to use a TPM and perform device attestation. A system can have trusted qualities instead of being 100% trusted. Cross-referencing different types of attestation data can provide evidence for trusted qualities. The decision of whether a device is trusted is not responsibility of the attester and verifier - these just gather and check the evidence. Example use cases of Time Attestation.

Intro

Use of Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), Measured Boot and [Remote] Attestation can provide significant security benefits to, arguably, the most sensitive and critical parts of a system, particularly the firmware and initial boot. However, the verification of attestation claims can be daunting and complex.

In this presentation, we briefly describe what measurements are and can be take, how these are reported by a TPM. What the TPM attest structures contain and how this information can be better understood in terms of device identity, configuration parameters, temporal aspects etc.

We conclude with a short demonstration(example as presentation platform allows) of attestation of trustable devices (servers, IoT, etc) focussing on certain temporal and device identity aspects.

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**Session Classification:** System Boot and Security MC

**Track Classification:** System Boot and Security MC