Secure Boot without UEFI: Booting VMs on Power(PC)

Daniel Axtens Linux Security Engineer



Contents

Background The powerpc-ieee1275 platform 03 Appended signatures 04 **Verifying Linux from Grub** 05 06 Demo Verifying Grub from Firmware 07 Appended Signature note 08 Signing flow 09 **Upstreaming status** 10

powerpc-ieee1275

- OpenFirmware (IEEE1275) environment.
- Device Tree based configuration.
- 32-bit BE ELF bootloader. Usually loaded from the PReP partition. No file system raw bytes on disk.
 - UEFI: PE bootloader, EFI system partition has a filesystem
- Used for VMs/Logical Partitions (LPARs) on modern Power Systems, and for old Macs.

Standard


Inactive-With

IEEE 1275-1994 - IEE Configuration) Fire Practices

BUY THIS STANDARD

Appended Signatures

- Originally used to sign Linux kernel modules.
- Can be used to sign kernels, verified by IMA on kexec.
- Distros sign ppc64le kernels like this already for OpenPower secure boot.



Verifying Linux from Grub

- Teach grub to verify appended signatures with an x509 certificate.
- Use existing grub features and concepts: e.g. verifier interface.
- Write as little crypto-adjacent code as possible:
 - PKCS#7 and x509 are based on ASN.1: import libtasn1.
 - Borrow PKCS#7 and x509 definitions from GnuTLS.
 - Use existing gcrypt code to do the actual maths.

```
return grub error (GRUB ERR BAI
buf = grub_zalloc (file_size);
if (!buf)
    return grub error (GRUB ERR OUT OI
                        "Could not all
```

Demo time

Booting

https://asciinema.org/a/kgDMBoZx9pNqGzkhZ70k kosVz


Commands

https://asciinema.org/a/kqhuUA70CuETzI4RDkkL1 hXf7

Verifying Grub from Firmware


Must be backwards compatible!

- If we use an appended signature, how does FW know if it is present?
 - Grub loaded from PReP partition: no file system, no file size, no clear EOF.
 - Cannot 'keep scanning': you could hit an old signature.
 - Length of signature varies depends on signing key and hash type.



Appended Signature Note

- We want:
 - all data to be within ELF structures
 - an ordinary appended signature that usual, unmodified tools understand
- Add a new SHT_NOTE section at the end of the binary to contain the signature.
 - descsz = ALIGN(signature size, 4)
 - Padding at the start of description, so appended signature magic is always at the end of the file.



Signing flow

Sign empty file to determine signature size.

Use new grubmkimage parameter to reserve space for the signature.

Generates a valid ELF file with a note but the description is all zeros. Truncate the excess zeros away.

Sign with usual tools.

Upstream status

Verification of Grub from Firmware with Appended Signature ELF note:

Already on list: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020 -08/msg00037.html

Note specification will be submitted for possible inclusion in forthcoming Power Architecture Platform Reference.

Verification of Linux from Grub:

Internal reviews and cleanup underway

Thank you

Daniel Axtens Linux Security Engineer

daniel.axtens1@ibm.com dja@axtens.net

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