

# Address Space Isolation (ASI)


Speculative execution protection

Google


Ofir Weisse, Junaid Shahid, Oleg Rombakh, and Paul Turner

# The Speculative Attacks Threat

- These are  $\mu$ -architectural attacks
- They break architectural boundaries
  - User/kernel boundary
  - Inter-process boundary
  - VM/host boundary
- They therefore compromise
  - Our customer's data
  - Infrastructure (host) credentials
- Current mitigations are either
  - High overhead, or
  - Incomplete



# What Can be Stolen



# Roadmap

- The Speculative Attacks Threat
- **L1TF Refresher**
- Why Mitigation is Challenging
- Address Space Isolation (ASI)


To learn more about speculative attacks:

[foreshadowattack.eu](https://foreshadowattack.eu)

[ofirweisse.com/MICRO2019\\_NDA.pdf](https://ofirweisse.com/MICRO2019_NDA.pdf)

# L1TF in a Nutshell

- Shared  $\mu$ -arch state can be stolen
  - L1TF - L1 cache
  - MDS - other  $\mu$ -buffers
- The state can be left by previous context
- Or provoked by the attacker
  - Via calling an API



# Roadmap

- The Speculative Attacks Threat
- L1TF Refresher
- **Why Mitigation is Challenging**
- Address Space Isolation (ASI)
- Initial Results




# The Challenge: Mitigations are Hard

1. Stop speculation, e.g., with lfences everywhere
  - **X** Extremely slow
2. Stop side-channels - that's a cat and mouse game
  - **X** E.g., L1D-cache, L1I-cache, BTB, branch-direction-predictor, etc. etc.
3. Stop speculation after branches
  - **X** Slow
  - **X** Error-prone
  - **X** Doesn't stop L1TF, MDS, etc

# The Challenge: Mitigations are Hard

1. Stop speculation, e.g., with lfences everywhere
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3. Stop speculation after branches
  - **X** Slow
  - **X** Error-prone
4. Scrub/flush secrets from state (L1 cache and other buffers)
  - **X** The attacker can trigger execution bringing data to these buffers
  - **X** The execution above can even be speculative!
  - **X** Async execution (interrupts), Hardware prefetch are additional vectors
5. HyperThreading complicates defenses even more!
  - **X** A sibling thread can snoop shared resources






# What mitigations are applied today? (1)

Disabling HyperThreading infeasible (cost, performance, etc)

So what can we do?

- Secure core scheduling
  - Never run two VMs on the same physical core




# What mitigations are applied today? (2)

Disabling HyperThreading is costly for performance/capacity

So what can we do?

- Secure core scheduling
- Flush L1 cache on VMENTER
  - Expensive




# What mitigations are applied today? (3)



Disabling HyperThreading is devastating for performance


So what can we do?

- Secure core scheduling
- Flush L1 cache on VMENTER
- On VMEXIT to hypervisor – make sure other sibling core is stunned (not running)
  - Very expensive




# What attack surface is open w/o constant flushes?

- On VMEXIT, interrupt handling may bring into cache/uarch-buffers data that
  - Belongs to other guests or
  - Is a platform secret
- That data can later be stolen via, e.g., L1TF
  - By the VM running after VMENTER
  - By sibling core during hypervisor execution




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- On VMEXIT, interrupt handling may bring into cache/uarch-buffers data that
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- That data can later be stolen via, e.g., L1TF
  - By the VM running after VMENTER
  - By sibling core during hypervisor execution
- Block-list approaches, i.e., removing specific sensitive memory, are may lead to a whac-a-mole



# Rethinking Mitigation - Understanding the Leak



**Status quo**: u-arch buffers are always (potentially) contaminated with secrets

**Sad conclusion**: Need to either a) stop speculation or b) continuously scrub state


# Rethinking Mitigation - Understanding the Leak



**Status quo:** u-arch buffers are always (potentially) contaminated with secrets

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# Rethinking Mitigation - Limiting Exposure




We want a way to circumscribe access to secrets and leakable state.

We then apply protection only when secrets are “in flight”



# Idea: #PF as a fork between speculative & non-spec exec



**We want a way to circumscribe access to secrets and leakable state.**

**We then apply protection only when secrets are “in flight”**

## Trivial example: Spectre V1 (bounds check bypass)

```
int foo(u8 *arr, int size, int index) {  
    if (index < size) {  
        // Should lfence  
        return global_array[ arr[index]* 64 ];  
    }  
    // ...  
}
```



If index is out of bounds, “arr” might speculatively still be accessed.

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
If &arr[index] is not mapped in the page-table → page-fault

**Question:** When do we scrub clean??



# Roadmap

- The Speculative Attacks Threat
- L1TF Refresher
- Why Mitigation is Challenging
- **Address Space Isolation (ASI)**
- Initial Results




# Concurrent efforts

Eventually - we need a complete solution for Linux

- Intel - unmap guest memory from the direct map (KVM protected memory)
  - One VM cannot access memory of another VM
- IBM - protecting containers
  - Allocate namespace-private memory
  - Per-process private (userspace) memory
  - Remove mapping from the global page-table
- Oracle
  - KVM address space isolation, similar to our effort (e.g. `#pf-fork`)
- Amazon
  - Allocate process local memory, removed from the direct map.


# Address Space Isolation - Premise

- On most VMEXIT's, the hypervisor only touches
  - Current guest stuff
  - Non sensitive data at the host




# Address Space Isolation - Basic Idea

- Split kernel memory to privileged and unprivileged-domains
- Each domain has a separate page-table
- Touching data out of a domain results in a page-fault - cannot be speculative
- At first, only include kernel addresses



# Address Space Isolation - Basic Idea


- Split kernel memory to privileged and unprivileged-domains
- Each domain has a separate page-table
- Touching data out of a domain results in a page-fault - cannot be speculative
- At first, only include kernel addresses
- ASI can be extended to include userspace memory






# ASI Lifecycle

```
//IOCTL KVM_RUN
for (;;) { // in vcpu_run()
    // call vmx_vcpu_run()
    asi_enter(); // Switch CR3 to unprivileged map
    // VMENTER
    // VMEXIT by the platform
    // Try to handle exit, may touch
    // privileged data, which will cause
    // A page fault --> asi_exit()
}
```




# What happens on a page-fault?

1. Call `asi_exit()` which will:
2. Call `pre_asl_exit()` callback which will
  - a. Stun sibling core
  - b. Log exit stat
3. Switch page table (CR3 in Intel) to the privileged page-table



# What happens on re-entry via `asi_enter()`?

1. Switch page table (CR3 in Intel) to the un-privileged Page-table
2. Call `post_asi_enter()` callback which will
  - a. Flush L1D cache and any other uarch buffer
  - b. Unstun sibling core




# Challenges

1. What data is OK to place within the unprivileged map?
  - a. Anything that belongs to the guest anyhow
  - b. Kernel maintenance structures which are used frequently and are not sensitive
2. How to handle PF/asi\_exits within interrupts, nmi's, etc.?
  - a. Must automatically re-asi\_enter() when done



# Handling Interrupts

```
//IOCTL KVM_RUN
for (;;) { // in vcpu_run()
    // call vmx_vcpu_run()
    asi_enter(); // Switch CR3 to unprivileged map
    // Interrupt? We must re-enter!
    // VMENTER
    // VMEXIT by the platform
    // Interrupt? Meh..
    // Try to handle exit, may touch
    // privileged data, which will cause
    // A page fault --> asi_exit()
}
```




# Challenges

1. What data is OK to place within the unprivileged map?
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2. How to handle PF/asi\_exits within interrupts, nmi's etc.?
  - a. Must automatically re-asi\_enter() when done
3. Integration with KPTI
  - a. Eventually ASI will hopefully also replace KPTI. Both write to CR3.
4. How to manage dynamic allocations (kmalloc/vmalloc)?
  - a. Some allocations are process specific, others are system-wide
  - b. We want to avoid synchronization between page tables
  - c. We want to minimize system wide tlb-flushes
5. In nested virtualization, L1 guest memory should be protected from L2

# ASI as a replacement for KPTI

- KPTI switches page-tables upon entry/exit to the kernel
- ASI (sometimes) switches page-tables upon entry/exit from a VM
- The same approach can, therefore, replace KPTI
  - To minimize page-table switches



# Initial Results - Redis YCSB

## Ratio of ASI-exits/VM-exits

```
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/0: Time 309.05 seconds, asi/vm exits = 46160 / 4506402 = 1.02 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/1: Time 291.67 seconds, asi/vm exits = 400531 / 1267665 = 31.60 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/2: Time 291.67 seconds, asi/vm exits = 413946 / 2323131 = 17.82 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/3: Time 291.63 seconds, asi/vm exits = 499027 / 1045507 = 47.73 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/4: Time 291.69 seconds, asi/vm exits = 482687 / 2013058 = 23.98 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/5: Time 291.62 seconds, asi/vm exits = 500809 / 2170556 = 23.07 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/6: Time 291.68 seconds, asi/vm exits = 478710 / 1775451 = 26.96 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9001da89000/7: Time 291.61 seconds, asi/vm exits = 482880 / 2059408 = 23.45 %
total_asi_exits = 3304750
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/0: Time 225.19 seconds, asi/vm exits = 489981 / 6257089 = 7.83 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/1: Time 225.00 seconds, asi/vm exits = 493745 / 1009584 = 48.91 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/2: Time 225.00 seconds, asi/vm exits = 756191 / 2425297 = 31.18 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/3: Time 225.00 seconds, asi/vm exits = 521712 / 1051189 = 49.63 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/4: Time 224.91 seconds, asi/vm exits = 23353 / 73144 = 31.93 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/5: Time 224.93 seconds, asi/vm exits = 19609 / 60075 = 32.64 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/6: Time 224.93 seconds, asi/vm exits = 26320 / 81998 = 32.10 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc90039f35000/7: Time 224.99 seconds, asi/vm exits = 22509 / 85046 = 26.47 %
total_asi_exits = 2353420
```



# Initial Results - Redis

## Exit details

RIP	data_addr	accessor	est_alloc_site	count	CDF
0xfffffffff811cecd3	0xfffff88563e42c938	el/sched/exclusive.c:7283	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1636	276673	1.000000
0xfffffffff811cecd3	0xfffff88554bc49938	el/sched/exclusive.c:7283	PO: ./kernel/events/core.c:10843	233775	0.887946
0xfffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a0612b0070	rn timer/sched/cputime.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	151020	0.793267
0xfffffffff811da155	0xfffff885585e57c58	el/sched/exclusive.c:7664	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	54685	0.732103
0xfffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a0612f0070	rn timer/sched/cputime.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	45065	0.709956
0xfffffffff81192686	0xfffff88554bc49938	ernel/sched/cputime.c:154	PO: ./kernel/events/core.c:10843	37279	0.691704
0xfffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a05ccf6cf0	rn timer/sched/cputime.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	32923	0.676606
0xfffffffff81192686	0xfffff88563e42c938	ernel/sched/cputime.c:154	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1636	31714	0.663272
0xfffffffff811da155	0xfffff8855596c4c58	el/sched/exclusive.c:7664	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	30228	0.650428
0xfffffffff811ced4d	0xfffffffff83a2b930	el/sched/exclusive.c:7315	config_consume_rt_capacity	29209	0.638185
0xfffffffff811c79a2	0xfffff885551c508d8	rn timer/sched/cputime.c:1284	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	24593	0.626356
0xfffffffff815f0880	0xfffff8854864b0380	./lib/llist.c:97	./fs/eventfd.c:658	24471	0.616395
0xfffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a060a6dfe0	rn timer/sched/cputime.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	21122	0.606485
0xfffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a060aece90	rn timer/sched/cputime.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	20673	0.597930

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```

7278 curr->se.exec_start = now;
7279 schedstat_set(curr->se.statistics.exec_max,
7280               max(curr->se.statistics.exec_max, delta_exec));
7281
7282 curr->se.sum_exec_runtime += delta_exec;
7283 account_group_exec_runtime(curr, delta_exec);

```

# Initial Results - Redis

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0xfffffffff815f0880	0xfffff8854864b0380	./lib/l1list.c:97	./fs/eventfd.c:658	24471	0.616395
0xf1628	static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)			21122	0.606485
0xf1629	{			20673	0.597930
1630	struct signal_struct *sig;				
1631					
1632	if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)				
1633	return 0;				
1634					
1635	#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION				
1636	sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct signal_struct),				
1637	GFP_KERNEL   GFP_NONSENSITIVE);				

NORMAL PASTE kernel/fork.c 55%



# Initial Results - Redis

## Exit details by allocation site


	variable	count	CDF
PO:	./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	760078	1.000000
PO:	./kernel/fork.c:1636	319451	0.692166
PO:	./kernel/events/core.c:10843	293764	0.562787
	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	208683	0.443812
PO:	./kernel/fork.c:249	193298	0.359294
PO:	./kernel/sched/topology.c:1766	157080	0.281008
	./kernel/fork.c:1860	63355	0.217390


RIP	data_addr	accessor	est_alloc_site	count
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a0612b0070	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	151020
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a0612f0070	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	45065
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a05ccf6cf0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	32923
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a060a6dfe0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	21122
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a060aece90	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	20673
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a05ccb6cf0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	20118
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a05cc36cf0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	19819
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a060ab0070	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	14848
0xffffffff8120541c	0xfffffe8a05b682f40	kernel/rcu/srcutree.c:418	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	14166
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a05cc76cf0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	13879
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a0612adfe0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	13765
0xffffffff811c79b1	0xfffffe8a060a2dfe0	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1284	PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284	12276

# Challenges in managing dynamic memory


1. How to manage different allocations
  - a. kmalloc
  - b. vmalloc
  - c. per-cpu
2. What does it mean for data to be non-sensitive?
  - a. Is memory non-sensitive for the current VM or system wide?

# The KPTI Model - Control & Data Privilege





# The ASI Model - Data Privilege





In ASI, we define privilege based on data access, not execution-level. We add another “restricted” page-table which only maps kernel **non-sensitive** data.

Data is deemed **non-sensitive** if, when stolen by a malicious VM, does not pose a security threat to other VMs or cloud's infrastructure.

For performance reasons, we're interested in memory that is accessed frequently by the kernel, when operating a VM between VMEXIT and VMENTER.

# The ASI Model - Data Privilege




Non-sensitive data can be accessed freely, without the need for any L1TF mitigations

Access to “unmapped” area will cause a PF, which will switch to the unrestricted page-table. Use L1TF mitigation when switching (stunning/L1D-flush)

Ignore for now





# Data Privilege - The Locality Dilemma

Kernel unrestricted  
page-table

userspace
Global kernel data
Global non-sensitive data
Process A data
Process B data
Other stuff we'll ignore for now
Kernel text, modules, globals

Kernel restricted  
page-table

userspace
Global kernel data
Global non-sensitive data
Process A data
Process B data
Other stuff we'll ignore for now
Kernel text, modules, globals

## Challenge 1

Is data considered non-sensitive locally in a process or globally in the entire system?

Examples:

1. Local data: VMCS, vcpu, file-descriptor-table
2. Global data: sk\_buffs


All non-sensitive data in ASI can be read by a guest VM via an L1TF attack

While we want VM-1 to access its VMCS freely we don't want VM-1 to read the VMCS of VM-2!!

# Partitioning Global/Local Data




## Kernel unrestricted



## Kernel restricted

### Page-table


### Process A



## Kernel restricted

### Page-table

### Process B




## Solution 1

Map local non-sensitive data to the specific process restricted table. Map global non-sensitive data to any ASI restricted table.

# Partitioning Global/Local Data




## Kernel unrestricted



## Kernel restricted

### Page-table


#### Process A



## Kernel restricted

### Page-table

#### Process B



## Challenge 2:


What happens when we allocate global non-sensitive data?

We need to update the page-tables of ALL processes on every allocation :(


That can be prohibitively slow, depending on how many processes are running ASL.

# Sharing Global Data Entries


Kernel unrestricted  
Page-table



Kernel restricted  
Page-table  
Process A



Kernel restricted  
Page-table  
Process B



Not mapped

Privileged data

Global non-sensitive data

Local non-sensitive data

Shared PMD tables

## Solution 2

Divide dynamic memory area into 2 regions:


1. Global non-sensitive
2. Local non-sensitive

To avoid constant update of global non-sensitive area in all processes - share the PUD entries

# Dynamic Memory - Synchronization

We manage all global non-sensitive allocations in a single “master-ASI” table.

If we get a PF in the global area, we pull the shared higher level page-table entry into the process ASI restricted-table




! Shared “notched” intermediate tables

# Dynamic Memory - Aliasing

Alternative approach to partitioning the direct map


Partition the kernel address range dedicated to the direct map into two equal halves, with the upper half being an alias of the regular direct map.



# Dynamic Memory - Aliasing

Alternative approach to partitioning the direct map

Partition the kernel address range dedicated to the direct map into two equal halves, with the upper half being an alias of the regular direct map.




`kmalloc(size, ASI_FLAG)` → address in aliased space

`phys_to_virt/virt_to_phys` etc. modified

Reduces max supported RAM size by half, if implemented in a straightforward way

# Dynamic Memory - Aliasing

In the restricted page tables, the aliased direct map only has local non-sensitive mappings, while the regular direct map only has global non-sensitive mappings






# Connecting All Efforts Together

- Eventually, Linux needs one complete solution
- Many similar use-cases - we should strive to merge
  - We need “union” of functionality for full protection
- There should be one paradigm/infrastructure to deal with
  - Per-process memory
  - Namespace memory
  - VM memory
  - Global non-sensitive memory

# Summary - efficiently defeating speculative attacks

1. ASI redefines access-control based on the data
  - a. Namely, sensitive vs. non-sensitive data
  - b. Instead of based on control-flow: userspace vs. kernel
2. A allow-list approach is more sustainable than block-list
3. Apply expensive (e.g., L1D flush, stunning) mitigations only when necessary
  - a. Yields a complete and efficient solution
4. Can extend KPTI model and even improve performance
5. We want to integrate with concurrent efforts!



# aerospike\_ycsb

```

KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/0: Time 155.94 seconds, asi/vm exits = 127380 / 5336308 = 2.39 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/1: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 158369 / 513023 = 30.87 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/2: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 121171 / 364944 = 33.20 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/3: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 106071 / 401861 = 26.39 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/4: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 122137 / 333260 = 36.65 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/5: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 108123 / 325609 = 33.21 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/6: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 102944 / 283367 = 36.33 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc9006ec95000/7: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 97132 / 272972 = 35.58 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/0: Time 246.45 seconds, asi/vm exits = 115375 / 5344884 = 2.16 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/1: Time 227.32 seconds, asi/vm exits = 170465 / 566336 = 30.10 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/2: Time 227.35 seconds, asi/vm exits = 106785 / 306784 = 34.81 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/3: Time 227.28 seconds, asi/vm exits = 118105 / 397094 = 29.74 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/4: Time 227.34 seconds, asi/vm exits = 122201 / 336527 = 36.31 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/5: Time 227.27 seconds, asi/vm exits = 116264 / 454567 = 25.58 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/6: Time 227.33 seconds, asi/vm exits = 117845 / 315211 = 37.39 %
KVM/VCPU 0xfffffc900338bd000/7: Time 227.26 seconds, asi/vm exits = 120306 / 329583 = 36.50 %

```

ip	address	allocator	count	function	variable	mem_type	allocation	CDF
0xffffffff811cecd3	0xffff885499d07bf8	0xffffffff8114641f	72811	el/sched/exclusive.c:7282	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	1.000000
0xffffffff811c7959	0xffff8855cccabc138	0xffffffff81131373e	57472	rnel/sched/cpuacct.c:1266	./kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5116	direct mapping	./kernel/events/core.c:8138	0.946175
0xffffffff811cecd3	0xffff88554f231bf8	0xffffffff8114641f	54673	el/sched/exclusive.c:7282	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	0.903689
0xffffffff811db7c5	0xffffffff83a2b930	0x9	38278	el/sched/exclusive.c:7220	config_discount_busy_poll_time	kernel text map	<Error: 0x9>	0.863272
0xffffffff81192696	0xffff88554f231bf8	0xffffffff8114641f	29422	ernel/sched/cputime.c:154	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	0.834976

## aerospike\_ycsb

```

KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/0: Time 155.94 seconds, asi/vm exits = 127380 / 5336308 = 2.39 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/1: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 158369 / 513023 = 30.87 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/2: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 121171 / 364944 = 33.20 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/3: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 106071 / 401861 = 26.39 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/4: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 122137 / 333260 = 36.65 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/5: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 108123 / 325609 = 33.21 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/6: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 102944 / 283367 = 36.33 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/7: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 97132 / 272972 = 35.58 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/8: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 115575 / 344884 = 2.16 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/9: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 66336 / 30.10 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/10: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 06784 = 34.81 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/11: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 349794 1.000000 97094 = 29.74 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/12: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 181553 0.741417 36527 = 36.31 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/13: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 54567 = 25.58 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/14: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 128836 0.607205 15211 = 37.39 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/15: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 93792 0.511964 29583 = 36.50 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc9006ec95000/16: Time 155.75 seconds, asi/vm exits = 82907 0.442628

```

ip	address	allocator	count	function	variable	mem_type	allocation	CDF
0xffffffff811cecd3	0xffff885499d07bf8	0xffffffff8114641f	72811	el/sched/exclusive.c:7282	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	1.000000
0xffffffff811c7959	0xffff8855cccabc138	0xffffffff8131373e	57472	rnel/sched/cpuacct.c:1266	./kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5116	direct mapping	./kernel/events/core.c:8138	0.946175
0xffffffff811cecd3	0xffff88554f231bf8	0xffffffff8114641f	54673	el/sched/exclusive.c:7282	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	0.903689
0xffffffff811db7c5	0xffffffff83a2b930	0x9	38278	el/sched/exclusive.c:7220	config_discount_busy_poll_time	kernel text map	<Error: 0x9>	0.863272
0xffffffff81192696	0xffff88554f231bf8	0xffffffff8114641f	29422	ernel/sched/cputime.c:154	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	0.834976



# netperf

[251 rows x 2 columns]

```
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/0: Time 425.39 seconds, asi/vm exits = 214111 / 5259680 = 4.07 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/1: Time 425.02 seconds, asi/vm exits = 247286 / 542627 = 45.57 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/2: Time 425.27 seconds, asi/vm exits = 245862 / 901932 = 27.26 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/3: Time 425.27 seconds, asi/vm exits = 288560 / 6982195 = 4.13 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/4: Time 425.26 seconds, asi/vm exits = 281123 / 5741351 = 4.90 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/5: Time 425.07 seconds, asi/vm exits = 206582 / 332710 = 62.09 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/6: Time 425.23 seconds, asi/vm exits = 207339 / 324566 = 63.88 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/7: Time 425.15 seconds, asi/vm exits = 337102 / 5772802 = 5.84 %
total_asi_exits = 2027965
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/0: Time 518.22 seconds, asi/vm exits = 238809 / 10276123 = 2.32 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/1: Time 518.82 seconds, asi/vm exits = 350573 / 2138048 = 16.40 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/2: Time 518.80 seconds, asi/vm exits = 220670 / 385801 = 57.20 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/3: Time 518.77 seconds, asi/vm exits = 243547 / 2612429 = 9.32 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/4: Time 518.12 seconds, asi/vm exits = 330598 / 1246831 = 26.52 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/5: Time 518.83 seconds, asi/vm exits = 239431 / 3858650 = 6.21 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/6: Time 518.80 seconds, asi/vm exits = 210698 / 344824 = 61.10 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/7: Time 518.80 seconds, asi/vm exits = 231221 / 2521580 = 9.17 %
total_asi_exits = 2065547
```

ip	address	allocator	count	function	variable	mem_type	allocation	CDF
0xfffffffff811c79a2	0xfffff88547a3428d8	0xfffffffff81307868	82179	rnsl/sched/cpuacct.c:1282	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	direct mapping	./kernel/events/core.c:10843	1.000000
0xfffffffff811cecd3	0xfffff885537e77bf8	0xfffffffff8114641f	60940	el/sched/exclusive.c:7282	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623	direct mapping	./kernel/fork.c:1623	0.932457
0xfffffffff811da155	0xfffff885627b4fc58	0xfffffffff8196e5fd	32622	el/sched/exclusive.c:7663	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	direct mapping	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	0.882370
	0xfffff8855b3980c58	0xfffffffff8196e5fd	28198	el/sched/exclusive.c:7663	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	direct mapping	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	0.855558
	0xfffff8856d8018c58	0xfffffffff81496be4	26941	el/sched/exclusive.c:7663	./net/core/skbuff.c:213	direct mapping	./fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1323	0.832382

## netperf

[251 rows x 2 columns]

```

KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/0: Time 425.39 seconds, asi/vm exits = 214111 / 5259680 = 4.07 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/1: Time 425.02 seconds, asi/vm exits = 247286 / 542627 = 45.57 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/2: Time 425.27 seconds, asi/vm exits = 245862 / 901932 = 27.26 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/3: Time 425.27 seconds, asi/vm exits = 288560 / 6982195 = 4.13 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/4: Time 425.26 seconds, asi/vm exits = 281123 / 5741351 = 4.90 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/5: Time 425.07 seconds, asi/vm exits = 206582 / 332710 = 62.09 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/6: Time 425.23 seconds, asi/vm exits = 207339 / 324566 = 63.88 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90035b71000/7: Time 425.15 seconds, asi/vm exits = 337102 / 5772802 = 5.84 %
total_asi_exits = 2027965
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/0: Time 518.22 seconds, asi/vm exits = 238809 / 10276123 = 2.32 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/1: Time 518.82 seconds, asi/vm exits = 350573 / 2138048 = 16.40 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/2: Time 518.80 seconds, asi/vm exits = 220670 / 385801 = 57.20 %
KVM/VCPU 0xffffc90036131000/3: Time 518.77 seconds, asi/vm exits = 243547 / 2612429 = 9.32 %
KVM/VCPU 0xf1count CDF 246831 = 26.52 %
KVM/VCPU 0xf1variable 858650 = 6.21 %
KVM/VCPU 0xf1./net/core/skbuff.c:213 310674 1.000000 44824 = 61.10 %
KVM/VCPU 0xf1PO: ./mm/percpu-vm.c:284 182433 0.744656 521580 = 9.17 %
total_asi_exits PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623 122907 0.594714
PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623 60004 0.402607
ip address allocator count function variable mem_type allocation CDF
0xffffffff811c79a2 0xffff88547a3428d8 0xffffffff81307868 82179 rnel/sched/cpuacct.c:1282 ./net/core/skbuff.c:213 direct mapping ./kernel/events/core.c:10843 1.000000
0xffffffff811cecd3 0xffff885537e77bf8 0xffffffff8114641f 60940 el/sched/exclusive.c:7282 PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1623 direct mapping ./kernel/fork.c:1623 0.932457
0xffffffff811da155 0xffff885627b4fc58 0xffffffff8196e5fd 32622 el/sched/exclusive.c:7663 ./net/core/skbuff.c:213 direct mapping ./net/core/skbuff.c:213 0.882370
0xffff8855b3980c58 0xffff8855b3980c58 0xffff8855b3980c58 28198 el/sched/exclusive.c:7663 ./net/core/skbuff.c:213 direct mapping ./net/core/skbuff.c:213 0.855558
0xffff8856d8018c58 0xffff8856d8018c58 0xffff8856d8018c58 26941 el/sched/exclusive.c:7663 ./net/core/skbuff.c:213 direct mapping ./fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1323 0.832382

```



# Which Accesses Cause ASI-exits

ip	address	function	variable	count	CDF
0xffffffff813bdbf1	0xffff88556abc1398	<b>./mm/memcontrol.c:886</b>	<Unknown alloc>	140972	1.000000
0xffffffff81194826	0xffff88556f858bf8	ernel/sched/cputime.c:148	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1620	51283	0.641108
0xffffffff811de7c3	0xffff885554673a20	el/locking/lockdep.c:3311	<Unknown alloc>	28769	0.510550
0xffffffff81029b0d	0xffff885556332bf0	/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5152	./arch/x86/kvm/../../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:1016	10452	0.437309
0xffffffff811ae0d1	0xffff88556e617ce84	kernel/sched/fair.c:15198	PO: ./kernel/sched/topology.c:1662	5422	0.410700
...	...	...	...	...	...
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb65f60	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000013
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb65f80	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000010
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb88620	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000008
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb88800	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000005
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb32110	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000003

```

876 struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_from_task(struct task_struct *p)
877 {
878     /*
879      * mm_update_next_owner() may clear mm->owner to NULL
880      * if it races with swapoff, page migration, etc.
881      * So this can be called with p == NULL.
882      */
883     if (unlikely(!p))
884         return NULL;
885
886     return mem_cgroup_from_css(task_css(p, memory_cgrp_id));
887 }

```

NORMAL mm/memcontrol.c

# Which Accesses Cause ASI-exits

ip	address	function	variable	count	CDF
0xffffffff813bdbf1	0xffff88556abc1398	./mm/memcontrol.c:886	<Unknown alloc>	140972	1.000000
0xffffffff81194826	0xffff88556f858bf8	ernel/sched/cputime.c:148	PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1620	51283	0.641108
0xffffffff811de7c3	0xffff885554673a20	el/locking/lockdep.c:3311	<Unknown alloc>	28769	0.510550
0xffffffff81029b0d	0xffff885556332bf0	/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5152	./arch/x86/kvm/../../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:1016	10452	0.437309
0xffffffff811ae0d1	0xffff8856e617ce84	kernel/sched/fair.c:15198	PO: ./kernel/sched/topology.c:1662	5422	0.410700
...	...	...	...	...	...
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb65f60	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000013
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb65f80	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000010
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb88620	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000008
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb88800	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000005
0xffffffff81366382	0xffff88559eb32110	./mm/gup.c:2174	./arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:30	1	0.000003

```

1613 static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
1614 {
1615     struct signal_struct *sig;
1616
1617     if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
1618         return 0;
1619
1620     sig = kmem_cache_zalloc(signal_cachep, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_NONSENSITIVE );
1621     tsk->signal = sig;
1622     if (!sig)

```



# Sorting by memory allocation

```

                variable    count    CDF
    <Unknown alloc> 174907 1.000000
    PO: ./kernel/fork.c:241 56949 0.554715
    PO: ./kernel/fork.c:1620 52524 0.409732
    PO: ./kernel/fork.c:165 12411 0.276015
    ./kernel/events/core.c:10196 11082 0.244418
    ...
    ./kernel/kthread.c:215 1 0.000013

```

What to do with unknown allocations?

```

ip                address                function                variable    count
0xfffffffff813bdbf1 0xfffff88556abc1398  ./mm/memcontrol.c:886 <Unknown alloc> 140972
0xfffffffff811de7c3 0xfffff885554673a20  el/locking/lockdep.c:3311 <Unknown alloc> 28769
0xfffffffff8119e82f 0xfffff88b684947f10  /kernel/sched/fair.c:9254 <Unknown alloc> 4856
0xfffffffff81366275 0xfffff88bdfdff660a8  ./mm/gup.c:2174 <Unknown alloc> 62
0xfffffffff8134ba16 0xfffff88603fffe908  ./mm/mmzone.c:68 <Unknown alloc> 30
...
0xfffffffffc00361f5 0xfffff8856cf70c540  net/google/gq/gq_tx.c:290 <Unknown alloc> 1
0xfffffffffc00361f5 0xfffff8856cf70c8a0  net/google/gq/gq_tx.c:290 <Unknown alloc> 1
0xfffffffffc00361f5 0xfffff8856cf70d008  net/google/gq/gq_tx.c:290 <Unknown alloc> 1
0xfffffffffc003757c 0xfffff8856ce5ef9ff  net/google/gq/gq_rx.c:551 <Unknown alloc> 1
0xfffffffff81b57cc6 0x7d1c7ffb43bd  x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:66 <Unknown alloc> 1

```

# Ratio of ASI-exits/VMEXIT's

SPECCPU-2006, perlbench\_r, partial run

```
[235 rows x 2 columns]
```

```
VCPU 0: Time 199.85 seconds, asi/vm exits = 84898 / 5071891 = 1.67 %  
VCPU 1: Time 199.85 seconds, asi/vm exits = 65118 / 125786 = 51.77 %  
VCPU 2: Time 101.45 seconds, asi/vm exits = 71434 / 153760 = 46.46 %  
VCPU 3: Time 101.49 seconds, asi/vm exits = 65966 / 271169 = 24.33 %  
VCPU 4: Time 101.50 seconds, asi/vm exits = 68709 / 291743 = 23.55 %  
VCPU 5: Time 101.50 seconds, asi/vm exits = 67701 / 125661 = 53.88 %  
VCPU 6: Time 101.44 seconds, asi/vm exits = 64486 / 440259 = 14.65 %  
VCPU 7: Time 101.50 seconds, asi/vm exits = 65211 / 196985 = 33.10 %  
VCPU 8: Time 101.43 seconds, asi/vm exits = 113477 / 646273 = 17.56 %  
VCPU 9: Time 101.50 seconds, asi/vm exits = 381747 / 674055 = 56.63 %  
VCPU 10: Time 101.48 seconds, asi/vm exits = 64326 / 259593 = 24.78 %  
VCPU 11: Time 101.44 seconds, asi/vm exits = 74550 / 148033 = 50.36 %  
VCPU 12: Time 101.49 seconds, asi/vm exits = 69588 / 130233 = 53.43 %  
VCPU 13: Time 101.50 seconds, asi/vm exits = 68766 / 283730 = 24.24 %  
VCPU 14: Time 101.47 seconds, asi/vm exits = 65379 / 125270 = 52.19 %  
VCPU 15: Time 101.48 seconds, asi/vm exits = 69624 / 137417 = 50.67 %
```