Safety in process CPU execution state

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Pre Release



About Ben

- Ben is senior engineer and long time Linux kernel contributor at Codethink.
- Codethink is an ethical, independent, and versatile software services company, expert in the use of Open Source technologies for systems software engineering.
 - More info at https://www.codethink.co.uk/



About Jens

- Jens Petersohn has been active in a variety of industries, the last 12 years in the automotive industry. He has been at Elektrobit for two years and prior to that at Continental AG for 10 years. In the past Jens has been employed at Silicon Graphics, Inc. in their Cray Supercomputer Division and has helped port Linux to the Intel IA-64 processor family.
- At Elektrobit Jens is responsible for ADAS and HAD products and has supported the development of EB corbos Linux for automotive applications for the last year.
- Elektrobit (EB) is an award-winning and visionary global supplier of embedded and connected software products and services for the automotive industry.
- A leader in automotive software with over 30 years serving the industry, EB's software powers over one billion devices in more than 100 million vehicles and offers flexible, innovative solutions for car infrastructure software, connectivity & security, automated driving and related tools, and user experience.
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Introduction

- What are we protecting and why
- The system
 - Linux with IEC61508 SIL-2 mixed criticality
- The code flow
- Possible faults and mitigations
- A review of our mitigation



The CPU state

- Concentrating on per-core state
- Directly accessible registers
 - Integer
 - Floating point
 - Accelerators (MMX, SSE, AVX, etc)
- Indirect
 - Core control registers (debug, interrupt, etc)



X86 64-bit core registers

ZMM0	YMM0 XMM0	ZMM1	YMM1 XMM1	ST(0)	MMO	ST(1) M	IM1	ALAHAXEA		R8B R8W R8D	R8 R12BR12V	R12DR12	MSWC	RO CR	4	
ZMM2	YMM2 XMM2	ZMM3	YMM3 XMM3	ST(2)		ST(3) M		вівнВХЕЕ			R9 R138R13V	(R13DR13	CR1			
ZMM4	YMM4 XMM4	ZMM5	YMM5 XMM5	ST(4)		ST(5) M	IM5	СССНСХЕ(R10BR10W R10D	R10 R148R14V	(R14DR14	CR2	CR	6	
ZMM6	YMM6 XMM6	ZMM7	YMM7 XMM7	ST(6)	MM6	ST(7) M	IM7	DLDHDXE		R11BR11W R11D	R11 R158R15V	/ R15D R15	CR3	CR	7	
ZMM8	YMM8 XMM8	ZMM9	YMM9 XMM9					BPLBPEB	RBP		DI IP	EIP RIP	MXCS	RCR	8	
ZMM10	YMM10 XMM10	ZMM11	YMM11 XMM11	CW	FP_IP	FP_DP F	P_CS	SIL SI ES	I RSI		SP			CR	9	
ZMM12	YMM12 XMM12	ZMM13	YMM13 XMM13	SW										CR1	10	
ZMM14	MM14 YMM14 XMM14 ZMM15 YMM15 XMM15			TW			8-bit register		register				256-bit register		CR11	
ZMM16 ZMM17 ZMM18 ZMM19 ZMM20 ZMM21 ZMM22 ZMM23 FP_DS									CR1	.2						
ZMM24 ZMI	M25 ZMM26 ZMM27	ZMM28 ZM	IM29 ZMM30 ZMM31	FP_OPC	FP_DP	FP_IP	CS	SS	DS	GDTR	IDTR	DR0	DR6	CR1	13	
							ES	FS	GS	TR	LDTR	DR1	DR7	CR1	4	
										FLAGS EFLAGS	RFLAGS	DR2	DR8	CR1	15	
												DR3	DR9			
												DR4	DR10	DR12	DR14	
												DR5	DR11	DR13	DR1	


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X86#/media/File:Table_of_x86_Registers_svg.svg

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How the code flows

- CPU executes instructions
- Intentional diversions
 - System calls
- External events
 - Interrupts
 - Exceptions (sync or async)
 - Signals (software events)
 - Architecture specific events





Faults and errors

- Not a complete list
- Mitigations
- Avoidance
- Useful Linux Kernel features



Hardware faults

Failure	Mitigations
Multiple or No entry	Verify actions post call Sequence numbers
Partial entry	KPTI SMAP, SMEP Memory permissions watchdog



Software faults

- Data corruption
 - Whole other topic
- Incorrect task switching
 - Kernel saves essential state on entry
 - Only swaps everything on re-schedule
- Bad kernel code
 - Non-integer use requires notification to kernel



Mitigation strategies

- Task isolation
 - Kernel threads still run
 - Interrupts and other events cannot be blocked
 - TL;DR you can reduce but not stop
- Kernel checking
 - Kernel sanitisers
 - Rewrite in safe language



Codethink mitigation

- Kernel code to detect errors
 - Using shadow state
 - \sim 2000 lines of C
- Wraps syscall and other entry points
 - Save state on entry
 - Compare on exit
- Detection not correction



Our mitigation issues

- Significant overhead to kernel access
 - 170% slower for integer
 - 460% slower for fp/mmx/sse
 - Tested with getpid() call
- Does not cover 100% of the kernel code
 - The entry_64.s not covered
- Upstream acceptability



Testing issues

- Time
 - Kernel oops requires reboot
 - Number of test combinations
- Virtual vs Real
 - qemu issues with things like segment registers
 - And sometimes it just crashes with little explanation
- How to induce actual CPU hardware/microcode faults?



Conclusions

- Mitigations can impact performance
- Difficult/impossible covering 100% of core failures
- Testing can be time consuming
- Going forward:
 - More user-space mitigations?
 - Partial task isolation?
- Any other suggestions



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