

Linux Kernel dependability - Proactive & reactive thinking

Shuah Khan Linux Kernel Fellow The Linux Foundation



We would like our

Systems

- Available
- Deterministic
- Reliable
- Responsive
- Resilient to remote and local attacks
- Safe & Secure

Data on these systems

- Easily accessible
- Easily shareable with trusted entities
- Safe from corruption
- Secure from unwanted intrusions

Bottom line, when we pick up our phones we want to be able to make calls, read news, take pictures, record video/audio and keep all of that data safe. In short – Dependable.



- Overflows
 - Heap
 - Integer overflows
 - Stack overflows
- Privileged information leak
 - kernel addresses in messages & API - sysfs etc.
- Insufficient error and boundary checking
- Out of bounds access

We are worried about being vulnerable to intentional and unintentional, remote and local user actions.

Obstacles



Obstacles

- Memory leaks
- Use-after-frees
- Uninitialized variable use
- Unsafe data from userspace
 - Input arguments e.g ioctls, system calls etc.
 - In network & usb etc. packets

We don't want kernel panics leading to out of service systems & unauthorized access leading to data leaks and losses.

Obstacles stand in the way of having highly available and dependable infrastructure & systems.



Reactive thinking

Find and fix regressions

- Fuzzers

Focus is on finding and fixing problems in the released code.

- Regression tests
- Use dynamic and static analysis tools
- Scan and identify vulnerabilities
- Harden kernel code paths

Proactive thinking

- Invest time in defensive designs
- Understand common design & coding mistakes
- Focus on detection, mitigation, testing before code release
- Use Static analysis
 - coccicheck, Sparse, Smatch etc.
 - Found gaps in tools enhance/write new
- Use Dynamic analysis & Regression testing
 - Syzkaller, Trinity fuzzer, scripts: e.g leaking_memory.pl
 - No existing test? Write one to go with your patch.
 - Use error injection tests

Focus is on finding and fixing problems before releasing the code.

LINUX

PLUMBERS CONFERENCE

August 24-28, 2020

Proactive designs

.

LINUX

PLUMBERS CONFERENCE

August 24-28, 2020

- Avoid leaking kernel addresses in kernel messages
- Avoid exposing kernel addresses in user API
- Error check input arguments from user-space
- Boundary (range) check input arguments from user-space
- Sanitize input arguments from user-space before use
- Pay attention to error and cleanup paths
- Avoid repeating mistakes with the use of common helpers
 - When a helper doesn't exist write one
- Kernel wide scope is this a common problem across subsystems?

Be mindful of error and cleanup paths



LINUX

PLUMBERS CONFERENCE

August 24-28, 2020

- Init and run-time paths can be easier to verify
- Error and cleanup paths are prone to
 - Memory leaks due to not releasing resources
 - Unbalanced lock acquire/release leading to potential deadlocks
- Enable debug config options to verify prove locks, locking.
 - e.g: CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK, CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
- Enable debug options to check for use-after frees and memory leaks
 - CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN, CONFIG_KMSAN, CONFIG_UBSAN



Connect the dots for effective testing



- Adding kcov hooks for collect coverage & facilitate coverage-guided fuzzing with syzkaller.
 - Reference: Linux 5.8
 kcov: collect coverage from usb soft interrupts
 work by Andrey Konovalov extends kcov to allow
 collecting coverage from soft interrupts and then
 uses the new functionality to collect coverage from
 USB code.



Regression test

- Regression test Kernel Selftests and other tests for regression
 - Run fuzz tests syzbot reproducers
 - Linux Arts (Linux Auto-generated Reg ressions Tests) Repo
 - Scan for vulnerabilities



Concurrency

- Race Condition Enabling Link Following: Race condition between file/dir status check and access. Related to TOCTOU and DAC
 - Detection KCSAN (?)
 - Mitigation
 - Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (seccomp)
 - Discretionary Access Controls (YAMA)



Concurrency

Signal handler race conditions

- Detection KCSAN (?)
- Mitigation
 - CONFIG_SIGNALFD: Allow receiving signals on file descriptor
 - pidfd_send_signal(): enables signaling a process through a pidfd to eliminate the PID wrap resulting in sending signals to a wrong process.



Memory Buffer Errors



- Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
- Write-what-where Condition
- Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer
- Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
 - Detection coccinelle, sparse, smatch, gcc W=1
 - Mitigation replace unbounded copy functions with safer API - e.g scnprintf() instead of snprintf()/strncpy()



Memory Buffer Errors

- Buffer Underwrite ('Buffer Underflow')
- Access of Memory Location Before Start of Buffer
- Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
 - sparse, smatch
- Out-of-bounds Read/Write
 - Detection: Static checkers, Dynamic syzkaller tests with CONFIG_KASAN



Resource Locking Problems

- Improper Resource Locking
- Missing Lock Check
- Double-Checked Locking
- Multiple Locks of a Critical Resource
- Multiple Unlocks of a Critical Resource
- Unlock of a Resource that is not Locked
- Deadlock



Resource Locking Problems



- Coccinelle: missing unlocks, double locks, find improper lock API usages) e.g: holding locks in paths that require no lock holds.
- Kernel Lock Torture Test Operation
 locktorture test
- Locking API boot-time self-tests
- Syzkaller



References



- CWE CATEGORY: Memory Buffer Errors
- CATEGORY: Resource Locking Problems

Bringing it all together

LINUX

PLUMBERS CONFERENCE

August 24-28, 2020

- Promoting & incorporating proactive thinking
- Identify detection/mitigation
 - Static analysis (static checkers + compilers)
 - Dynamic analysis (test tools + config + features)
- Extend and write new detection tools as needed
- Harden framework/code for identified gaps
 - e.g work: pidfd_send_signal(), seccomp(), %n, scnprintf() use etc.
- Others