

東京 **2025**

**LINUX
PLUMBERS
CONFERENCE**


TOKYO, JAPAN / DECEMBER 11-13, 2025

Aspects of Dependable Linux Systems

Kate Stewart, Linux Foundation
Philipp Ahmann, Etas GmbH (BOSCH)

Safe Systems with Linux MC

Linux is being used in Safety Critical Systems today...



source: <https://www.tesla.com/ownersmanual>



source: <https://www.spacex.com/mission/>

What is Functional Safety?

Definition of Safety

The freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either directly, or indirectly because of damage to property or the environment.

Definition of Functional Safety

The part of safety that depends on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs.

Detecting potentially dangerous conditions, resulting either in the activation of a protective or corrective device or mechanism to prevent hazardous events or in providing mitigation measures to reduce the consequences of the hazardous event.


In Functional Safety you expect...

...that the software:

- does behave as specified,
- does not interfere or impair other system components
- all possible erroneous events are addressed somehow or somewhere...

and you have sufficient evidence to prove this.


Samples of safety (integrity) standards




- Standards represent industry **best practices developed over 50+ years**
- Share similar demands for requirements and evidence
- Rigor on measures/demands may differ
- **All system parts need to be known, tested and managed**

Standards seek to increase system quality

- Requirements
- Testing
- Documentation
- Traceability





Challenge with Safe Usage of Linux Kernel

Each patch has a reason for being added to tree - "what" & "why"

- Frequently contained in patch series overview, but may be part of email discussion.
- Understanding "what" the code should do, is considered as a "**requirement**" on a component (like the kernel) when doing functional safety system analysis.
- Testing the functionality for when it **works**, and when it **does not work** is needed as "evidence" that is required to assess "Safe Usage".

Challenge: The Linux Kernel has no way of systematically capturing "what" the code is expected to do in a machine readable form.

If the "assertions about the code" (may be referred to as specifications or requirements) are reverse engineered by others, where should they be stored, so they can be reviewed by maintainers and other experts?

What mechanisms should be used to link the code & tests to these requirements?

A morning towards „Safe Systems with Linux“

Addressing code

- Practical Qualification efforts
- Program Verification
- Requirements definition

& tools


- KUnit Test improvements
- StrictDoc next to Kernel documentation
- Kernel Requirements tool
- Tooling & Traceability discussions

10:00	Aspects of Dependable Linux Systems "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Philipp Ahmann et al. 10:00 - 10:10
	NVIDIA Approach for Achieving ASIL B Qualified Linux: minimizing expectations from upstream kernel processes "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Igor Stoppa 10:10 - 10:35
	Applying Program Verification to Linux Kernel Code: Challenges, Practices, and Automation "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Keisuke Nishimura 10:35 - 11:00
11:00	Defining and maintaining requirements in the Linux Kernel "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Gabriele Paoloni et al. 11:00 - 11:30
	Break "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	11:30 - 12:00
12:00	KUnit Testing Insufficiencies "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Matthew Whitehead 12:00 - 12:25
	Exploring possibilities for integrating StrictDoc with ELISA's requirements template approach for the Linux kernel "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Tobias Deiminger 12:25 - 12:40
	BASIL: Traceability as Code "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Luigi Pellecchia  12:40 - 12:55
	Tooling and Sharing Traceability Discussion "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Luigi Pellecchia et al. 12:55 - 13:20
13:00	Wrap up and next steps "Hall B4", Toranomon Hills Mori Tower	Kate Stewart et al. 13:20 - 13:30

Safety Critical Systems

*“Assessing whether a system is safe,
requires understanding the system sufficiently.”*

- Understand your system element within that system context and how it is used in that system.
- Select system components and features that can be evaluated for safety.
- Identify gaps that exist where more work is needed to evaluate safety sufficiently.



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