

# Syzbot BoF (2025)

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# Agenda

- Statistics (2025)
- Updates (2025)
  - Domain
  - Patch Fuzzing
  - Coverage Aggregation
  - Rust Code Fuzzing
  - KVM
  - KFuzzTest
- 2026
  - Revisit Email Reporting
  - Patch Fuzzing (cont)
  - AI + Patch Generation & Code Reviews

# Context


**syzkaller** is a coverage-guided kernel fuzzer.

**syzbot** is a continuous kernel build / fuzz / report aggregation system.

**syzbot** uses **syzkaller** for the actual fuzzing.


Since 2017, syzbot has reported more than **13,500** bugs to the mailing lists.

# Reported Findings (Yearly)




# Bug Fixes (Yearly)

Yearly kernel commits that mention syzbot or syzkaller.



# Patch Testing Requests (Yearly)



Updates (2025)

# New Domain!

We're now also available at:

<https://syzbot.org/>

# Patch Fuzzing ("syzbot CI")

<https://ci.syzbot.org>

Syzbot CI

All Series Statistics

Cc'd

Status

Only with findings

Filter


Previous

Next

Published	Title	Version	Author	Status
2025-12-02 10:17 UTC	<a href="#">drm: Reduce page tables overhead with THP</a>	11	loic.molinari@collabora.com	in progress
2025-12-02 10:16 UTC	<a href="#">mm/slab: introduce kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache() for cache destruction</a>	1	harry.yoo@oracle.com	in progress
2025-12-02 09:57 UTC	<a href="#">net: dsa: mxl-gsw1xx: fix SerDes RX polarity</a>	1	daniel@makrotopia.org	finished in 55m0s

There's also a separate [syzbot CI talk](#) at the Kernel Testing & Dependability MC today.

# Patch Fuzzing: High-Level Approach



**Objective:** share results before series are applied to maintainer trees.

# Patch Fuzzing: Questions / Discussion

- Have you already encountered "Syzbot CI" reports?  
What is missing / what can be improved?
- It's possible to add more steps to the processing pipeline (e.g. run some test utilities).
- **To maintainers:** how would such a pre-merge fuzzing best fit into your workflow?

# Coverage Reports


Heavy programs are now excluded from the coverage reports, so these reports have reasonable size again.

Name	Last active	Uptime	Corpus	Coverage <input type="checkbox"/>
<a href="#">ci-qemu-gce-upstream-auto</a>	now	8h32m	27360	<a href="#">405716</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu-native-arm64-kvm</a>	now	7d14h	1771	<a href="#">24096</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu-upstream</a>	now	1h59m	23312	<a href="#">377318</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu-upstream-386</a>	now	1h45m	44344	<a href="#">672631</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu2-arm32</a>	now	11h50m	123057	<a href="#">136137</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu2-arm64</a>	now	11h59m	43892	<a href="#">50342</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu2-arm64-compat</a>	now	11h59m	31322	<a href="#">36631</a>
<a href="#">ci-qemu2-arm64-mte</a>	now	12h03m	167633	<a href="#">181462</a>

These are clickable!

# Aggregated Coverage Reports

The web dashboard now displays the coverage report that is aggregated across all syzkaller instances fuzzing a particular kernel.



It can be used to identify coverage gaps for particular kernel subsystems.

# Rust Code Fuzzing

**New:** support for Rust code fuzzing.

- CONFIG\_KCOV works for the Rust code (kudos to Alice Ryhl!)
- Syzkaller can generate coverage reports for the Rust code.
- Syzbot can now compile CONFIG\_RUST=y kernels.

**First results:**

8 findings in the Binder/Ashmem implementations.

# KVM Fuzzing

A dedicated effort to improve KVM fuzzing coverage.

- Overhauled KVM API descriptions (Host-side improvements).
- SYZOS Framework (ARM: 2024–2025, x86: 2025):
  - Concept: Instead of random instruction sequences, generate commands interpreted by an immutable guest-side library.
  - Stability: Harder to break by random mutations (parameters mutate, logic stays valid).
  - Capabilities: Unlocks advanced features like IRQ routing and Nested Virtualization.
  - Validation: Allows better, reproducible testing of guest states.
- Running on bare-metal hosts in addition to Google Cloud.

# KFuzzTest: property-based testing for the kernel

Work in progress (under upstream review).

```
FUZZ_TEST_SIMPLE(test_pkcs7_parse_message)
{
    pkcs7_parse_message(data, datalen);
}
```

`/sys/kernel/debug/kfuzztest/test_pkcs7_parse_message/input_simple`  
is the entry point for the userspace fuzzer(s).

Find out more at [KFuzzTest: Targeted Fuzzing of Internal Kernel Functions](#) later today!

2026

# Email Reporting Challenges

We send emails via **GAE**, which does not add proper **DKIM** signatures.

The problem has been highlighted this year, both in the context of **syzbot CI** reports and for normal syzbot reports, e.g. in [a recent thread](#) by Linus Torvalds.

We are exploring the ways to address the problem:

- Send emails from a **@syzbot.org** domain, where we can control **DKIM**.
- Send emails from a **syzbot@kernel.org** address.
  - This will likely break our **syzbot+HASH@domain** bug report identification scheme.

# Patch Fuzzing (continued)


The current system is mostly a PoC, there remains more work to be done:

- Expand to more mailing lists
- Tune the efficiency of the system:
  - Determining the right base tree/commit is a major challenge.
  - Focused fuzzing and finding triage improvements.
- Offer on-demand patch fuzzing to shift it even more left?
  - E.g. by fuzzing all series sent to a special mailing list, before it's sent to the public mailing lists of the corresponding subsystem(s).

# AI Patch Generation?

In 2026, we want to pilot (\*) the AI-based patch generation functionality on syzbot.

(\*) *High enough precision being a prerequisite.*



# AI Patch Generation: Questions / Discussion

Is it in line with the current AI-generated code policies of the Linux kernel?

What extra information / functionality would simplify the code review?

As a maintainer, what would you demand of such patches?

# AI-based Code Reviews?

Apparently, a hot topic nowadays.

Syzbot CI has the infrastructure to monitor incoming patch series and do processing on them, so it could also take host an AI agent for code reviews.

**But we need to align since similar bots are already deployed by individual kernel subsystems.**

# Questions

Any other questions or comments?

**Also never hesitate to reach out to [syzkaller@googlegroups.com](mailto:syzkaller@googlegroups.com)**