


### Aspects of Dependable Linux Systems

Kate Stewart, Linux Foundation
Philipp Ahmann, Etas GmbH (BOSCH)

Safe Systems with Linux MC



# Linux is being used in Safety Critical Systems today...





source: https://www.tesla.com/ownersmanual

source: <a href="https://www.spacex.com/mission/">https://www.spacex.com/mission/</a>



#### What is functional safety?

#### Definition of Safety

The freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either directly, or indirectly because of damage to property or the environment.

#### Definition of Functional Safety

The part of safety that depends on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs.

Detecting potentially dangerous conditions, resulting either in the activation of a protective or corrective device or mechanism to prevent hazardous events or in providing mitigation measures to reduce the consequences of the hazardous event.





#### In Functional Safety you expect...

#### ...that the software:


- does behave as specified,
- does not interfere or impair other system components
- and all possible erroneous events are addressed somehow or somewhere.

And you have sufficient evidence to prove this.





#### Samples of safety (integrity) standards







#### Standards seek to increase system quality

- Requirements (being explicit about assertions)
- Testing & Evidence
- Documentation
- Traceability









#### Challenge with Safe Usage of Linux Kernel



- frequently contained in patch series overview, but may be part of email discussion.
- Understanding "what" the code should do, is considered as a "**requirement**" on a component (like the kernel) when doing functional safety system analysis.
- Testing the functionality for when it **works**, and when it **does not work** is needed as "evidence" that is required to assess "Safe Usage".

**Challenge:** Linux Kernel does not have a way of systematically capturing the "what" code is expected to do in a machine readable form.

If the "assertions about the code" (may be referred to as specifications or requirements) are reverse engineered by others, where should they be stored, so they can be reviewed by maintainers and other experts?

What mechanisms should be used to link the code & tests to these requirements?

#### An afternoon towards "Safe Systems with Linux"

Addressing:		15:00	Aspects of Dependable Linux Systems	Kate Stewart et al.
		10.00	"Hall N2", Austria Center	15:00 - 15:15
	Systems		Verifying the Conformance of a VirtIO Driver to the VirtIO Specification  "Hall N2" Austria Center	Matias Vara Larsen 15:15 - 15:45
			nati NZ., Austria Lenter  ks-nav	Alessandro Carminati
	Static Analysis		"Hall N2", Austria Center	15:45 - 16:00
		16:00	Source-based code coverage of Linux kernel	Wentao Zhang et al.
	Code Coverage		"Hall N2", Austria Center	16:00 - 16:15
			BASIL development roadmap	Luigi Pellecchia
	Acquirements / Tracability		"Hall N2", Austria Center	16:15 - 16:30
	Aequirements / Traceability		Break	
			"Hall N2", Austria Center	16:30 - 17:00
		17:00	Enabling tooling independent exchange of Requirements and other SW Engineering related information Nicole Pappler	ation with the upcoming SPDX Safety Profile
	SBOM		Throwing Cinderblocks at Safety Engineering	Chuck Wolber
			"Hall N2", Austria Center	17:25 - 17:50
	System Engineering		Improving kernel design documentation and involving experts	Gabriele Paoloni
	oystem Engineering	18:00	"Hall N2", Austria Center	17:50 - 18:10
	D		Discussion of Next Steps	Kate Stewart et al.
Œ	Documentation		"Hall N2". Austria Center	18:10 - 18:30

Vienna, Austria Sept. 18-20, 2024



#### Safety Critical Systems

## "Assessing whether a system is safe, requires understanding the system sufficiently."

- Understand your system element within that system context and how it is used in that system.
- Select system components and features that can be evaluated for safety.
- Identify gaps that exist where more work is needed to evaluate safety sufficiently.



