Building for Safety in a Security and Feature Focused World

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
- B.S. Mathematics, Washington State University
- B.S. Computer Science, Seattle University
- Contributor to several early editions of Red Hat Linux Bible
- Co-author of Linux Toys (Wiley Publishing)
- President and BDFL Tacoma Linux Users Group
- 20+ Years Boeing Software Engineer
 - Inducted to Technical Fellowship in 2022.
 - Developed a (DO-178B/C) design certified Linux platform delivered on most Boeing Aircraft



Punchline First



Build System



Vienna, Austria Sept. 18-20, 2024

Loose Federation Problems

- Breaking change upstream...
- Mysterious incompatibilities...
- Security bug in unmaintained branch...
- Priority mismatch...
 - Upstream ♥ features!
 - Build stability!

Safety


Specified Function +
Deterministic Behavior Safety

Safety Engineering = Hazard Assessment + Design Mitigation + Implementation Assurance

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Design Expression



Implementation

Implementation Assurance

Semantically speaking...

$$\Sigma T1 == \Sigma T2 == \Sigma T3 == \Sigma T4 == \Sigma T5 == Implementation$$



Safety Problems

Loose Federation Problems

Plus...

- Design expression is resource intensive.
- Implementation assurance is resource intensive. Assessing change impact is difficult.



Now What?

"The kernel gets nine patches per hour, requirements are never going to be a priority." - GKH (Paraphrased)

- Design Expression
 - SPDX FuSa Machine readable safety model, including requirements!
- Implementation Assurance
 - llvm-cov Patches submitted to Linux Kernel
- Assessing Change
 - Delta Kernel <u>github.com/elisa-tech/delta-kernel</u>

