
Remote Attestation of AMD SEV-SNP Confidential VMs

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Virtual TPM for Confidential VMs



• Why?

- Standard vTPMs cannot be safely used in Confidential VMs since their state would be accessible by the hypervisor
- Privileged module in the SVSM
 - vTPM state is not accessible outside of the SVSM (e.g. hypervisor and guest OS)
- TPM drivers are enlightened to communicate with the SVSM-vTPM
 - TPM communication goes through the hypervisor, encrypted
- Existing TPM tools can be reused
 - IMA, tpm2-tools, etc.
- github.com/coconut-svsm/svsm.git
 - vTPM PR#135

vTPM communication


Securing the vTPM state

- What is included in the vTPM state?
 - vTPM seeds, key hierarchies, objects stored in the vTPM NV, etc
- How much of the (post-)manufactured vTPM state need to be persisted across boots?
 - It really depends on the use case!
- Persistent vTPM state, generally speaking:
 - vTPM is manufactured once and securely persisted to a location outside of the CVM
 - Encrypted vTPM state is injected on every boot, e.g.:
 - Injected in the VM launch at a known memory region
 - Injected in the VM early boot (e.g. network or host proxy)
 - vTPM state should be loaded at early boot and only if the guest is in the expected initial state (early pre-attestation)
 - vTPM state changes should be securely persisted to a location outside of the CVM
- What if the vTPM state is ephemeral?
 - vTPM is manufactured on every boot
 - vTPM state doesn't leave the confidential VM enclave

Remote attestation using an ephemeral SVSM vTPM

- PoC using keylime
 - 1. Keylime setup
 - 2. Attestation client registers the CVM on every boot with the Registrar
 - 3. Verifier attest the CVM against the policy
- For the demo: TPM EK certificate is replaced by the VMPLO attestation report
 - Include the CVM launch measurement
 - Include vTPM information sha512(EK_pub)
 - Report is signed by the Secure Processor using AMD key
- github.com/coconut-svsm/svsm.git
 - Attestation report, PR#69
- Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2023)
 - Remote Attestation of Confidential VMs Using Ephemeral vTPMs

Demo step 1: setup keylime



Demo: <u>https://youtu.be/Bv6aMoxo5B8</u>