Modernizing Android BPF & The Android BPF Security Model Neill Kapron < nkapron@google.com >



The State of BPF in Android

- Outdated libraries- libbpf, bcc, bpftool
- Custom/curated library for BPF program development
- Limited functionality enabled
 - No CO-RE
 - Few helpers
 - No bpftrace

The State of BPF in Android

Android Concepts

Android BPF Security

Current Implementation

CO-RE + Access Control



Android BPF Goals

- Enable Modern BPF functionality
 - o CO-RE
 - Libbpf helpers
- Enable secure vendor access to BPF tracepoints
- Build solid foundation for future use cases

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Android Concepts

- Bionic standard C library
- Each user+application combination has a dedicated UID
- Two Kernel branches for each release
 - Android14–5.15, Android14–6.1
- Older devices can upgrade to new OS with older kernels
- ACK Android Common Kernel
- GKI Generic Kernel Image
- KMI Kernel ABI Stability maintained within kernel branches
 Android14-5.15, Android14-6.1, etc
- Trusted file systems dmverity
- Supports armv7, aarch64, x86, x86_64, riscv64

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Questions



Android BPF Stakeholders

Debugging & Development

Development, Performance, & Test
 Engineers

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Release Telemetry & Functionality

- Networking/Tethering/Bandwidth Measurement
- System
- SOC & Device Manufacturers 'Vendors'



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Current Android BPF Security Restrictions

- Limit loading capabilities to a single system program
 - (now separate loader for networking)
 - Partially due to previous requirement for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- Loader program is one-shot (exits upon loading programs in early init)
- Selinux restrictions
- Control BPF program attach points.
- BPF Program types restricted based on source
- Certain hooks (fentry/fexit) must remain disabled




Android's BPFloader

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Android's File Systems Relevant to BPF


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Kernel



Supported Program Types

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BPF Program Types	Networking	System	Vendor
CGROUP_SKB	Y		
CGROUP_SOCK	Y		
CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR	Y		
KPROBE		Y	R
PERF_EVENT			R
SCHED_ACT	Y		
SCHED_CLS	Y		
SOCKET_FILTER	Y	Y	Y
TRACEPOINT		Y	R
XDP	Y		

Y = Supported, R = Requested

Challenges

- Boot time
- Memory overhead
- Kernel/Userspace/BPF object ABI compatibility
- Security



Possibilities for Enabling CO-RE in Android

- Implement custom Android-Specific library
 - Constant development and maintenance required as new BPF features are created
 - Can optimize for our specific use case
- Integrate Libbpf into existing bpfloader
 - Does not solve boot time problem
 - Potential for significant increase in memory usage
 - Potential problems with compatibility between vendor BPF programs and system libbpf library version
- Enable BPF programs to use libbpf natively
 - Allows developers and vendors to choose when their programs are loaded
 - Resolves compatibility issue between system libraries and vendor bpf programs
 - Requires additional work to develop access control mechanism
- Other approaches?

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Attach Point Access Control

- Need to verify that tracepoints are part of KMI before attaching
 - KMI varies between kernel branches
 - KMI additions can occur post kernel release (requires allowlist updatability)
- Could be accomplished via allowlist in bpfloader
 - Check bpf program's attach points prior to loading into kernel
 - Allowlist must be dynamic and maintain support for all kernel versions
- BPF Program/Kernel Module based access control
 - Add hooks into bpf_prog_load() and bpf_prog_attach() functions
 - First BPF program loaded as part of boot
 - Check subsequent bpf progs against running kernel's KMI
 - Enables the control of 'native' libbpf programs
 - Output of the control of the cont

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
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Attach Point Access Control


BPF Loader Allowlist Approach

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Attach Point Access Control



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BPFloader Open Questions

- What is the compatibility story for libbpf?
 - On we need a trampoline library for future API changes?
- What can be done to optimize loading at boot time?
- Can system BTF data be cached by loader process?
 - Refactor libbpf calls to allow passing in BTF object
- Do we need to extend metadata for selinux policy?

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'Native Libbpf' Open Questions

- Will this approach pass security review?
- How do we get KMI ACL from kernel
 - O Do we create a subset of KMI?
- How to pair BPF object with filesystem source for verification?
- What can be done to optimize BTF memory footprint?



Thank You!

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