



# Setting up Binder for the future

Alice Ryhl and Carlos Llamas



# What is Binder?


**Binder is used for communication between processes in Android**



# What is binder?

- Yet another **IPC/RPC**
- **BeOS -> PalmOS -> Android**
- Used **extensively** in Android
- Provides access to framework services
- Composed of **libbinder** (userspace) and **binder driver**

# Client-Server Model



# Why binder driver?

- Zero in-kernel buffering
- Write and read in a single ioctl()
- Priority Inheritance
- Share file descriptors
- Remote object management
- Weak/Strong reference counting
- Death notifications
- and many more...

# Why rewrite Binder?

# Challenges that Binder faces

High complexity

Accumulated technical debt

Security issues

High complexity makes it difficult to resolve tech debt without causing security issues.



# Security issues in Binder

1

## High vulnerability density

Binder's density is around 3.1 vulnerabilities per kLOC.

2

## Not getting better

Binder has averaged ~3 high/critical severity vulnerabilities per year over the past 6 years.

3

## Risk is not theoretical

We are aware of exploits for about half of the vulnerabilities in Binder.

4

## Security critical

Even Android's most de-privileged sandboxes have direct access to Binder.

# Binder has high complexity

- Binder is full of **complex** features
- It must do all of this as fast and **efficiently** as possible.
- **Minor performance regressions** can cause a noticeably degraded user experience.



# Things to improve

Thousand line functions

Error-prone error handling

Improving the code is risky

Not a unique example

```
err_dead_proc_or_thread:
    binder_txn_error("%d:%d dead process or thread\n",
                    thread->pid, proc->pid);
    return_error_line = __LINE__;
    binder_dequeue_work(proc, tcomplete);
err_translate_failed:
err_bad_object_type:
err_bad_offset:
err_bad_parent:
err_copy_data_failed:
    binder_cleanup_deferred_txn_lists(&sgc_head, &pf_head);
    binder_free_txn_fixups(t);
    trace_binder_transaction_failed_buffer_release(t->buffer);
    binder_transaction_buffer_release(target_proc, NULL, t->buffer,
                                     buffer_offset, true);

    if (target_node)
        binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
    target_node = NULL;
    t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
    binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
    if (secctx)
        security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
err_get_secctx_failed:
    kfree(tcomplete);
    binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
err_alloc_tcomplete_failed:
    if (trace_binder_txn_latency_free_enabled())
        binder_txn_latency_free(t);
    kfree(t);
    binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
err_alloc_t_failed:
err_bad_todo_list:
err_bad_call_stack:
err_empty_call_stack:
err_dead_binder:
err_invalid_target_handle:
    if (target_node) {
        binder_dec_node(target_node, 1, 0);
        binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
    }

    binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_FAILED_TRANSACTION,
                "%d:%d transaction %s to %d:%d failed %d/%d/%d, size %lld-%lld line %d\n",
                proc->pid, thread->pid, reply ? "reply" :
                (tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY ? "async" : "call"),
                target_proc ? target_proc->pid : 0,
                target_thread ? target_thread->pid : 0,
                t_debug_id, return_error, return_error_param,
                (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
                return_error_line);

    if (target_thread)
        binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
    if (target_proc)
        binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);

    {
        struct binder_transaction_log_entry *fe;

        e->return_error = return_error;
        e->return_error_param = return_error_param;
        e->return_error_line = return_error_line;
    }
}
```

# Things to improve

Thousand line functions

Error-prone error handling

Improving the code is risky

Not a unique example

## CVE-2020-0041 was introduced during refactoring

The fix:

```
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index e9bc9fc..b2dad43 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3310,7 +3310,7 @@
     binder_size_t parent_offset;
     struct binder_fd_array_object *fda =
         to_binder_fd_array_object(hdr);
-    size_t num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) *
+    size_t num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) /
         sizeof(binder_size_t);
     struct binder_buffer_object *parent =
         binder_validate_ptr(target_proc, t->buffer,
@@ -3384,7 +3384,7 @@
         t->buffer->user_data + sg_buf_offset;
     sg_buf_offset += ALIGN(bp->length, sizeof(u64));

-    num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) *
+    num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) /
         sizeof(binder_size_t);
     ret = binder_fixup_parent(t, thread, bp,
         off_start_offset,
```

# Things to improve

Thousand line functions

Error-prone error handling

Improving the code is risky


Not a unique example

```
* bde4a19fc04f ("binder: use userspace pointer as base of buffer space")  
* 16981742717b ("binder: fix incorrect calculation for num_valid")
```

```
* 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")  
* 32e9f56a96d8 ("binder: don't detect sender/target during buffer cleanup")  
* bdc1c5fac982 ("binder: fix UAF caused by faulty buffer cleanup")
```

```
* a0c2baaf81bd ("android: binder: Don't get mm from task")  
* da1b9564e85b ("android: binder: fix the race mmap and alloc_new_buf_locked")  
* a43cfc87caaf ("android: binder: Stop saving a pointer to the VMA")  
* b0cab80ecd54 ("android: binder: fix lockdep check on clearing vma")  
* 44e602b4e52f ("binder_alloc: add missing mmap_lock calls when using the VMA")  
* 1da52815d5f1 ("binder: fix alloc->vma_vm_mmm null-ptr dereference")  
* 3ce00bb7e91c ("binder: validate alloc->mm in ->mmap() handler")
```

# Rust Binder



# Why is Rust a good fit?

Rust makes ownership visible in the type system and enforces it

## In C

```
/*  
 * The caller must have taken a  
 * temporary ref on the node.  
 */  
BUG_ON(!node->tmp_refs);
```

## In Rust

```
// This does not compile if caller  
// has not taken a temporary ref on  
// self.  
fn my_fn(self: &Arc<Self>) {
```



# Why is Rust a good fit?

Rust makes ownership visible in the type system and enforces it

In C

```
/*
 * @from, @to_proc, and @to_thread can be set
 * to NULL during thread teardown
 */
struct binder_transaction {
    struct binder_work work;
    struct binder_thread *from;
    struct binder_transaction *from_parent;
    struct binder_proc *to_proc;
    struct binder_thread *to_thread;
    struct binder_transaction *to_parent;
    struct list_head fd_fixups;
    /* + other fields */
}
```

Read the code to find out whether these own a ref-count

Compiler does not check this

In Rust

```
pub(crate) struct Transaction {
    node_ref: Option<NodeRef>,
    stack_next: Option<Arc<Transaction>>,
    from: Arc<Thread>,
    to: Arc<Process>,
    file_list: SpinLock<List<Box<FileInfo>>>,
    // + other fields
}
```

Lock protects only this field

Owns a ref-count, never null

Owns a ref-count but nullable

android

# Why is Rust a good fit?

## You can't forget to clean up

### In C


```
err_translate_failed:
err_bad_object_type:
err_bad_offset:
err_bad_parent:
err_copy_data_failed:
    binder_cleanup_deferred_txn_lists(&sgc_head, &pf_head);
    binder_free_txn_fixups(t);
    trace_binder_transaction_failed_buffer_release(t->buffer);
    binder_transaction_buffer_release(target_proc, NULL, t->buffer,
                                     buffer_offset, true);

    if (target_node)
        binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
    target_node = NULL;
    t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
    binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
    if (secctx)
        security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
err_get_secctx_failed:
    kfree(tcomplete);
    binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
err_alloc_tcomplete_failed:
    if (trace_binder_txn_latency_free_enabled())
        binder_txn_latency_free(t);
    kfree(t);
    binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
err_alloc_t_failed:
err_bad_todo_list:
err_bad_call_stack:
err_empty_call_stack:
err_dead_binder:
err_invalid_target_handle:
    /* it keeps going ... */
```

### In Rust

```
}
```

# Rust prevents almost all vulnerabilities in Binder



# Rust Binder

## Feature parity

Implements all features in C Binder.

(except for some debugging facilities)

## Passes tests


Passes all Binder tests in aosp.

Can boot a device and run a variety of apps without issues.

## Promising performance


On a simple benchmark, drivers have similar performance.

Still a lot of work to do.




# Performance looks promising


Average latency with no payload




99 percentile latency with no payload



Average latency with 4k payload





99 percentile latency with 4k payload



# Code size

Rust spends less code on handling errors.



-  Rust Binder
-  C Binder



# What about unsafe?

The majority is due to binderfs.



- Safe Rust in Binder
- Unsafe Rust in Binder



# What about abstractions?

You only have to get them right once,  
across all drivers.


- Safe Rust in Binder
- Unsafe Rust in Binder
- Abstractions





**"If you can implement Binder in Rust, you can  
implement any driver in Rust"**

**– Ricardo Ribalda (ChromeOS kernel engineer)**



**Thank you for your  
attention!**

