

DECENTRIQ

Securing trusted boot of confidential VMs


Stefan Deml <Stefan.Deml@decentriq.com>

Andras Slemmer <Andras.Slemmer@decentriq.com>

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Motivation for using Confidential Computing

Enable confidentiality and integrity of multi-party remote computations.




Required security guarantees:

- Memory confidentiality
- Memory integrity
- Memory freshness
- Code auditability
- Attestation of the TCB and software running remotely
- Control flow integrity:
 - Process based CC (SGX)
 - VM based CC (TDX, SEV) ?


Attestation of remote software: Measured Boot

Boot Process


Static: Large firmware






Static: Hash chain



Dynamic:
- Isolation (VMPL)
- PCR like scoping




Attestation



Providing Control flow integrity (CFI)

- Firmware: **OVMF**
 - long-term CC support
- Hypervisor: **QEMU/KVM**
- VM parameters passed in:
 - memory size/e820
 - CPU Count
 - ACPI,
- Kernel: stripped down
 - Limit IO to VSOCK
- Virtualized devices
 - RNG
 - Time
 - Option ROM
 - Virtio PCI



Problem: How do we provide CFI using existing software (OVMF, linux)?

Thank You

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